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Taxes and Labor Supply
ABSTRACT
Over 75% of Federal tax revenue is raised through the income tax and
FICA taxes. The potential effects on labor supply and economic welfare
are important because of the large and increasing reliance on direct
taxation. Over the past few years significant legislative changes have
occurred with respect to taxation of labor: the 25% tax cuts,indexation,
the tax credit for working spouses, and likely increases in FICAtaxation.
I reviewrecent econometric work which measures the effect of taxes on labor
supply and which analyzes the likely effects of tax law changes on labor
supplyand economic welfare.
Sections1 and 2 develop the theory and econometric techniques for
models of labor supply with taxes. Section3 discussesthe various tax
systemsin the U.S. In Section 4, I present empirical estimates for husbands'
and wives' labor supply functions. The economic cost of the taxsystem is
also estimated. In Section 5 the individual questionnaire data forhigh
income individuals is reviewed. Lastly, in Section 6 evidence from the
negative income tax experiments and for social security beneficiaries is
considered. These lattergroups face extremely high marginal tax rates








The effect of taxes on labor supply introduces interesting questions in
economic theory, econometrics, and public finance. Since the greatest share of
federal tax revenue, approximately 50 percent in 1980, is raised by the
individual income tax, we are certainly interested in its effects on economic
activity. The federal income tax is based on the notion of 'ability to pay'
and its progressive structure has received wide acceptance. The income tax has
not been thought to induce large economic distortions so that it has been
generally accepted as probably the best way to raise revenue where an unequal
distribution of income exists. At the same time we finance socialsecurity by
PICA which is a proportional tax with an upper limit. As both the tax rate and
limit have grown rapidly in recent years, PICA taxes have become thesubject of
much controversy. In 1980 FICA taxes represented 28% of total Federal tax
revenue. In Table 1 the income tax and payroll tax revenues are given for the
period 1960—1980. It is interesting to note over that same period while the
marginal income tax rate of the median taxpayer remained constant-, the FICA tax
•rate more than doubled. -Atthe same time the earnings limit rose about 220% in
constant dollars. Over the same 20 year period the corporate income tax has
decreased from 24% to 13% of Federal tax revenues. Likewise, excise taxes have
decreased from 13% to 5%. must taxes on labor supply currently amount to about
3/4 of Federal taxes raised.1 Their potential effects on labor supply and
10f course, not all income tax revenue is a tax on laborsupply because of the
taxation of capital income which was about 12% of adjusted gross incorne in 1980.
Also, a portion of the incidence of FICA taxes fall on the employer although the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































welfare are important because of thelarge and increasing reliance on direct
taxation.
To measure empirically the effectof taxes on labor supply, problems in
economic theory and econometrics need tobe treated. First, the effect of
progressive taxation is to create a
convex, nonlinear budget set where the net,
after tax wage depends on hours worked.Since most of consumer theory is based
on constant market prices which areindependent of quantity purchased,
theoretical notions such as theSlutsky equation need to be modified toassess
the effect of a change in the tax
rate. Theoretical problems increase in
complexity when we realize that other provisions of thetax code such as the
earned income credit, the standarddeduction, and FICA together with transfer
programs such as AFDC create important nonconvexities
in the budget set. Then
certain portions of the budget setcannot correspond to utility maximizing
points. Little definite knowledgecan be gained by a theoretical analysis of the
effect of taxation. In fact,we cannot usually tell whether an increase intax
rates will increase or decrease hoursworked. Nor can we decide how an increase
in exemptions or other similarchanges will effect hours worked. Thus,only
empirical investigation candeterminethe sign and magnitude of the effect of
taxation.
Appropriate econometric techniques tomeasure the effect of taxation also
need to treat the nonlinearity of thebudget sets which taxation creates. Other
problems such as components of the stochasticspecification, litited dependent
variables, and unobserved wages for nonworkers arise.Econometric procedures to
handle these problems,
many of which have only recently been developed, have been
used to estimate labor supply functions.We review these results and discuss the4
possible effects on labor supply. of various tax reform proposals whichhave been
enacted or have been discussed in the U.S.
The other important aspect of the taxation of laborsupply is the effect on
economic welfare. If Hicksian deadweight loss (excess burden) isaccepted as the
appropriate efficiency measure of the distortion created by taxation,we know
that the deadweight loss is proportional to thesquare of the tax rate.' The
ratio of deadweight loss to tax revenue raised risesapproximately with the tax
rate. In Table 1 it can be seen that the marginal tax rate for themedian
taxpayer is 26% while the top marginal tax rate on labor supply is 50%. If
compensated labor supply elasticities are non—zero, even though small, the
deadweight loss from the income tax is likely to be substantial. Theimportant
redistributive aspect of the income tax must not be lost sightof, but the cost
of the current means of doing so is an important consideration.Again, we will
consider various tax reform proposals and their possible effecton economic
welfare.
The plan of the paper is as foj.lows. Section 1 considers thetheory of
labor supply with taxes. The effect of the nonlinearity of thebudget sets
complicates the analysis so few definite conclusions can be reached. In Section
2 we develop an econometric model of labor supply so that theproblems created by
convex and nonconvex budget sets can be solved. Section 3 discusses the various
tax systems in the United States. The federal income tax, FICA tax, and state
income taxes all are used to develop the appropriate budget sets. Ye also
discuss AFDC, social security benefits, and a negative income tax to determine
how they affect labor supply budget sets. In Section 4 we presentempirical
estimates for husbands and wives labor supply functions. We also calculate
'See Auerbach (this volume) for a discussion ofappropriate welfare measures in
the presence of taxation.5
the economic cost of the tax system for certain individuals.Because of small
numbers in crass section samples, and mesurenient problems, high income
individuals are difficult to treat within the context of a laborsupply model.
Thus, in Section 5 we review the individual questionnaire data for high income
people. It is interesting to note that it agrees broadly with the econometric
evidence. In Section 6 we review the evidence from the negative income tax
experiments and from samples of social security beneficiaries. These individuals
face extremely high marginal tax rates so that interesting evidence of the ffect
of taxes is produced in these situations.6
1.The Theory of Labor Supply with Taxes
In a world without taxes, the theory of laborsupply is characterized by the
same conditions which characterize the theory of consumer demaM.That is, the
Slutsky conditions completely exhaust the theoretical restrictionson consum.er
response to a price change. Thus, in most previous work Ofi the effectof
taxation on labor supply, the authors consider taxesas lowering the net, after
tax wage. Using the Slutsky equation
(1.1)dhbh hbh
dwOwu=u ày
we decompose the change in hours into the substitution effectand the income
effect. Since labor is supplied while leisure isdemanded, the sign of the
substitution effect is positive, while the sign of the incomeeffect is negative
if leisure is a normal good. We can conclude that thesign of the sum of the
effects is indeterminate. It might then be considered thegoal of empirical
analysis to determine the sign and magnitude of the effect of taxation.
'However, this approach is seriously misleading in allcases except one.
Consider the two good diagram of Figure 1.1. Thecomposite good is used as
numeraire so consumption is measured on the vertical axis withhours supplied on
the horizontal axis. Non—labor income is denotedby y. The original pre—tax
market wage is w and preferred hours of labor are h*. Theeffect of a
proportional tax is then to lower the net, after taxwage to wt= w(l—t).





increaseor decrease according to equation (1.1). Thus, in thecase of
proportional taxation, the traditional analysis is correct.But, only for
proportional taxes is the analysis so simple. Whatmakes the proportional tax
case so special is that non—labor incomey is unaffected by the tax which is
implicitly assumed to be only a tax on labor income.If y were also subject to
taxation at rate t, we would have to takeaccount of another income effect which
would cause h* to rise. Equation (i.i) would thenneed to be modified to account
for taxation of y to
(1.2)4i=Ji_4hohohdy dtàw u=udt ày àydt
When we consider the effect of taxation, theincome and substitution effect of a
change in the wage as well as the change in non-laborincome must be accounted
for. This equation becomes the key device inanalyzing the effect of taxation on
w0
-H a8
desired hours of work. The total effect of taxation is still indeterminatebut a
complication has been added since changes in both w and y must be considered. In
cases of progressive taxation or government tax and transferprograms, both w and
y are affected. The traditional analysis has neglected to account for the effect
on y of the tax system. We now consider how the analysis changes whennon-
proportional tax systems are considered.
Let us first analyze the simplest case, that of a progressive taxon labor
income so that the marginal tax rate is non—decreasing. In figure 1.2three
marginal tax rates are considered, t1,t2,t3, which lead to three after—tax net
wages, w1 ,w21w3, where w. w(1—tj. H1 and H2 correspond to kink point hours
which occur at the intersection of two tax brackets. But anithportant addition
tothe diagram are the "virtual" incomesy2andy3, which follow from extension





the individual faced the linear budget setB2= (w2,y2), he would still choose
hours of work h* as in Figure 1.2. Inassessing the effect of taxation on labor
supply, two questions arise. How does h* in Figure 1.2 differ from theno—tax
situation of Figure 1.1? And how is h* in Figure 1.2 affectedby a change in the
market wage w or the tar rates,t?
To consider the first question in Figure 1.3 we combine Figures 1.1and 1.2.
We see that no general effect can be identified. If theindividual's h* falls on
the first budget segment B1= (w1 ,y1) we are back in thecase of Figure 1.1 with
offsetting income and substitition effects. Alternatively, if h* fallson either




substitution effect, while virtual incomey2 or y3 exceeds and a further




One result which does follow is that on the budget segment
B2 or B3 labor supply
is less than it would be if the analysis were based on
(w,y1) or (w3,y1); that
is, if the effect of the virtual income were ignored.
To answer the second question we initially consider an increasein the
market wage from w to w'. In Figure 1.4 we see that thiswage change leads to a
clockwise rotation of the budget set. The effect of the rotationis to raise the
w. ,butit also leaves the virtual incomes imchanged. For instance, thevirtual 1
t—t 1—t
income is y2= Ei(i2 1) —y1(1 where is the earnings limit for the
first tax bracket. Thus, the virtual incomes depend onlyon the tax system and
nonlabor income, y1 .Therefore,so long as the individual's preferred hours of
work h* remain on the same budget segment B., the effect ofa wage change can be





The effect of a change in a taxrate t. depends on whicht changes. To
take the simplest case,suppose t3 rises so that in Figure 1.2 the segment
rotates counterclocIc-rise. The virtualincome y3 also rises. We have thesame
effect as before where the change inwage alone induces both an income and
substitution effect and the change in virtualincome induces more labor supply
from equation (1.2). It is important tonote that a person whose preferred hours
were previously on the third budget segmentB3 so that h* > H2 may now shift doim
to the second budget segmentB5 so that H1 < h* < H if the substitution effect
is large enough. Individuals whosepreferred hours were less thanH2 before the
change will not be affected. However, if the tax ratewere to decrease we could
again have people shifting from the secondsegment to the third segment because
of the substitution effect. For thesecasee, we need "global' information on the
individual's preferences, since the localinformation in the Slutsky equation is
not sufficient to analyze the possiblechanges. Now if either t1 ort2 were to
change, the situation is more complicated since all
later budget segments are
also affected. However, the laterbudget segments are affected only by a change
in their virtual income since the netwage remains the same. Thus, if t1 rises,
for those individuals with h* >H1, the effect of the tax change is to cause
their preferred hours to rise. Forpeople dwhose h C H1 initially only
changes (althoughy1 may change also) so that the Slutalcy equation can be used.
Lastly suppose one of the tax bracket limitsE1 changes. If is lowered, all
virtual incomes on later budget segments fall.Therefore if initially h* >H1 we
have a similar qualitative effect to a rise int1. Preferred hours of work will
rise. FQr an individual whose initial h* C
H1but with have H' < h* the
analysis is more complicated. They may switch to
B212
with its lower net wage, and higher virtual incomeor they may decrease their
desired hours of work so that h* < and they remain on the first segment.
From the analysis of the progressive taxcase we see that very few general
propositions can be deduced about. the effect of taxes on laborsupply. The
piecewise linear progressive tax system is definedby a sequence of budget
segments B.= (w.,y.) of net wages and virtual incomes for theindividual over a
set of hours (H.,H.1). Some litnited resultsare possible for changes in t. and
E. for individuals whose initial hours of workare on a subsequent budget segment
B.., j>0. But to assess the effect of taxationadequately we really need to
knowthe individual's preferences or equivalently, hisutility function. Ye will
show how knowledge of his utility function arises inthe process of estimating
his labor supply function so that numericalcomputations of the effect of
taxation can be carried out.
When we do not have a progressive tax system, mattersbecome more complex
since the budget set is no longer convex.2 Non—convexbudget sets arise from the
presence of government transfer programs. The three most importantprograms of
this type are AFDC, Social Security benefits, anda negative income tax (NIT)





budget sets.3 In the first type of budget set used in the NITexperiments,
and in the majority of AFDC programs, non-labor incomeis raised by the amount of
the government transfer. The individual then facesa high marginal tax rate,
usually .4 or higher, until he reaches H, the breakevenpoint at which all
benefits have been taxed away. Beyond the breakevenpoint, the individual
rejoins the federal tar system, here taken to be convex.Figure 1.6 has one
additional complication which arises as an earningsdisregard in Social Security
benefits or as a maximum payment amount in some AEDO progras.4Hours up to H1
are taxed only at FICA rates where H. is determined byE1. Beyond this point,
the individual faces the high marginal rates until breakevenhours are again
reached. On a priori grounds, almost nothing can be said aboutthe effect of
taxation in the non—convex budget case. The addedcomplication arises from the




Figures 1.7 and 1.8 demonstrate two cases of multiple tangencies although
actual cases may be even more complex due to the possibility ofskipping entire
budget segments. The possibility exists of having multiple optima as in
Figure 1.7
Figure 1 .7 because w1 < w3 whiley2 K In the convex case this possibility
does not arise because asw1 falls y is rising. To determine the global optimum
we need to have lmowledge of the utility funttion. Figure 1.8 demonstrates the
caseof a joint tangency the possibility of which arises with each non—convex
segment.Small changes in the wage or any parameter of the tax system can then
lead to large changes in desired hours of work.
In the convex budget case, we must always have a tangency which is unique







had two tangencies we could connectthe two points, and theconnecting lines
which would lie inside the originalbudget set would represent preferredpoints
by the assumed concavity of preferences.S
Furthermore, the effect of h* of a
-
changein the market wage, taxes, or theearnings limits is "smooth" in an
appropriate mathematical sense that the change iscontinuous and differentiable.
For the non—convex case, thisreasoning no longer follows since the line
connecting the multiple tangencies no longer lies withinthe budget set. Thus,
multiple tangencies may occur. Likewise, the effect ofchanges in the budget set
are no longer smooth, since a small changemay cause a jump in desired hours from
an initial tangency to the neighborhood of another
initial tangency. Thus, it
seems that no general propositions hold. The extendedSlutsky equation (1.2) is
not usable since the possibility of a
jump from one budget segment to another is
always present.
Ye briefly consider the cases wherewe could say something definite in the
convex case: a rise in t1 or a drop in for individuals not on the first
segment. For individuals who remain on theconvex budget segments likew2 and
in Figure 1.7 virtual incomes again fall whilew1 remains constant so that the
local efect is again a rise in desired hoursof work. But one cannot rule out
the possibility of a non—local jump down tothe first segment or even withdrawal
from the labor force entirely. Similarpossibilities exist if F1 is decreased.
Thus, the analysis of the non—convex case cannotproceed without knowledge about
the form of the individual's utility function.
Importantpotential shortcomings exist in this theory of laborsupply which
wenowdiscuss briefly. Future work on an econometricmodels will need to
incorporatethese problems into the theory and estimation.First, individuals16
mayface quantity restrictions in labor supply. That is, h*may not be possible
for systematic reasons. Certainly "involuntary" unemployment fallsinto this
category. In principle, even if quantity restrictions exist wecan estimate the
underlying demand function or preference structure andanalyzethe effect of
taxes. But a more difficult problem is to ascertain if individualsare actually
constrained. Endless debates on the possibility of involuntaryunemployment
highlight this problem. Furthermore, survey questions on the ability ofa person
to work more hours are very untrustworthy. To date, only limitedprogress has
been made on this problem.7 Better data seems to be required toput quantity
constraints into an empirical model in a totally satisfactoryInantler.
This type of labor supply theory also does not adequately treatthe type of
jobs people take or their intensity of work while on the job.8 An effect of
taxes is to make nonpecuniary rewards more attractiveso that a measure of
earnings may seriously misrepresent the preference comparisons being madeamong
jobs. Academics need hardly be reminded of this fact in thepresent world of
falling real academic wages. Yet it is doubtful that this problem willever be
completely solved. "Perks" from a job could be evaluated monetarily and included
in earnings. But we cannot hope to measure adequately certaintypes of non—
monetary rewards to jobs.
A last consideration is intertemporal aspects of the model. We have
considered a static world devoid of human capital considerations and
intertemporal factors such as savings. But intertempora]. issuesmay be quite
important for new entrants into the labor market and for individuals close to
retirement. The eighty—hour weeks put in by young lawyers will be rewardedin
thenot-too-distant future so that current compensation is an inadequatemeasure17
of earnings. Furthermore, ussues ofon—the—job training may be important. To
date, research on issues of intertemporal laborsupply have indicated only
limited empirical importance of this problem.9 But furtherempirical research
based on less restrictive modelsmay find a more important role for intertemporal
considerations.
In this section we have considered froma theoretical point of view the
effect of taxes on labor supply. The Slutskyequation which has been
traditionally used to analyze the problem is inadequateexcept for the case of a
proportional tax. Progressive taxation results in a convex budgetconstraint
which leads to a multiplicity of netwages and virtual incomes. We see that
except for a few cases the effect of a change in the tax rate cannot be
determinedon a priori grounds even ifreasonable assumptions are made such as
leisurebeinga normal good. Government tax and transferprograms result in non—
convex budget sets which are even more difficult to analyzetheoretically. thus,
we now turn to the econometrics of the problem so that modelscan be estimated.
From the estimated models we can assess the effect oftaxation. However, as with
all models we discuss certain aspects of theproblem which have not been
included. The results should be interpreted with thislimitations in mind.18
NOTES
1It may well be this latter income effect which creates theappearance of
a backward bending labor supply curve which has been found inmanyempirical
studies. The important point here is that no only dowe have a income effect
fromthe change in wage, but virtual income also rises due to theeffect of the tax system.
2As we will discuss subsequently, even the federal taxsystem is not truly convex because of the effect of Social Security payments, the earned income
credit, and the standard deduction. However, it may well be thecase that
treating taxes in a convex budget set is a sufficiently goodapproximation for empirical work.
A non—convexity may also arise, not from the tax system, butdue to fixed
costs to working, e.g., }{ausman (igeo). We will discuss firedcosts in the next section.
See Hanoch and Honig (1978) for a theoretical analysis of theSocial Security case. Burtless and Moffitt (1982) discuss the SocialSecurity budget set within a model of labor supply and retirement. See alsoBlinder, Gordon, and Wise(1980) fora treatment of intertemporal considerations.
See Hausman (1979) for further analysis and implications of thiscase.
6
The necessity of paying benefits, except for SocialSecurity payments, is
not a sufficient reason when total compensation is taken intoaccount. Of
course, most studies use the gross wage and neglect benefits due to lack of data.
Ham (1982) has introduced quantity constraints into a laborsupply model
without taxes. See Deaton (1981) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1981) forfurther
research on quantity restrictions. Brown et al. (1982) haveattempted to
incorporate quantity restrictions in a short term labor supply model whichdoes
incorporate taxation.
8
To the extent that wages reflect intensity of work, thisproblem mAy not
be too serious. However, for many jobswages may be only loosely related to
current effort with longer—run goals important. ¶e,discuss this issue
subsequently. See Rosen (1960) foradiscussion of these problems.
MacCurdy (1981) has estimated an interteinporal model of labor supply.
However, he did not consider the effect of taxation within the model.19
2. Tax Systems
In the previous section we havediscussed the theory of laborsupply with
taxes. We will now describe the
type of tax systems which exist in the United
States. To give a historical
perspective on the problem, we will outline the
evolution of the income tax rateover the century. We will also providedata on
actual marginal tax rates since 1960 whenthe data becomes available. We shall
discuss federal and state income taxesfirst. It turns out that eventhough the
basic federal income tax is
progressive, the resulting budget set thatan
individual faces is not convex. FICA
payments, the standard deduction, and the
earned income credit all introduce
nonconvexities. These additions to the basic
progressive tax system will be explained. Nextwe discuss AFDCtaxsystems for
each state. Lastly we briefly discusstaxsystemsfor social security
beneficiaries and negative income tax(NIT) recipients. All of these taxsystems
have very large nonconvexitiestogewther with quite high marginal taxrates.
We first outline the basic federalincome tax system in 1980 by 12
brackets.1 The first bracket is$1,000 wide with succeeding bracketsfalling at
intervals of $4,000. Since we are interestedin the effect of taxes on labor
supply, we consider only taxes on earned income.Table 3.1 lists the brackets
along with the marginal tax rates andaverage tax rates at the nidpoint of the
bracket. It is interesting to note thatthe average tax rate renains
significantly below the marginal tax rate untilquite high levels of earned
income are reached. Thus a theory whichstated that individuals react toaverage
after tax income when making marginaldecisions might cce up with rather
different results. However, the theory ofindividual behavior with respect to20
Table 2.1
Basic Federal Tax Rates for 1980 on Earned Incomefor Married Coup1es












progressivetaxation contains both the marginal netwage and the appropriate
virtual income which reflects average tax ratesup to the current tax bracket.
In a certain sense, the entire characteristicsof the tax system are accounted
for in this way.
In determining taxable income personalexemptions need to be accounted for.
An exemption of $1000 per person was allowed in1980. The standard deduction, or
zero bracket amount, was $3,400 for married couples in1980. Itemized deductions
in excess of $3,400 could also be subtracted fromgross income. They were
approximately 9% of adjusted gross income in 1980. The standarddeduction i.e.,
no itemized deductions, was used on approximately 70% ofall tax returns in 1980.21
Next, the earned income credit grants a credit of io%below$5,000 of gross
income. Prom $6,000 to $10,000 the credit is reducedby 12.5% so that the
brerakeven point is reached at $10,000 when the credit hasbeen completely
exhausted. A nonconvexity is created at $10,000 becausethe tax rate falls by
the 12.5 payment when the breakeven point is reached.Lastly PICA contributions
were 6.05% up to a limit of $25,900 in 19a0. Thus, in theappropriate bracket
when the PICA limit is reached, the marginal tax rate fallsfrom about .38 to
about .32 which also creates a nonconvexity.3 Weprovide some historical data on
tax rates and actual marginal rates toprovide a historical perspective on the
income tax system.4
In Table 2.2 we provide a summary ofmarginal tax rates for the period 1950—
1984, according to current legislation.5 These rates are forsingle taxpayers
with no exemptions or deductions accounted for. Wealso give the CPI and median
family income so that valid comparisons across differentyours can be made.
First, note that the tax system between 1950 and 1980was only imperfectly
indexed for inflation. The median income faceda marginal tax rate of 22% in
1950, but multiplied by the change in the CPI, this amount faceda mrginal rate
of 26% in 1960. Similarly $10,000 of earned income in1950 had a marginal tax
rate of 38% in 1950, but adjusted for inflation, thismarginal tax rate increased
to 43% in 1980. Similar increases in marginal tax ratesoccurred over th&
periods 1960—1980 and 1970—1980. Of course, this imperfect indexation
corresponds to greater progressivity which may have been the intent ofCongress
over the period. However, note that under the tax reform of1981, marginal rates
will drop substantially by 1984 due to the 25% tarreduction, with the exact
amount depending on inflation over the 1982-1984 period. Much ofthe 'bracket22
creep' of the past decade will be eliminated. Under current legislation, thetax
system will then be indexed after 1964. Another interesting finding which
emerges from Table 2.2 is the significantly higher marginal tax rates faced by
the median earner over the period. Besides the effect of inflationand imperfect
indexation, real wage growth also led to higher marginal taxes. Lastly, note
the remarkable decline in maxinjura taxes or earned income whicharose with the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. To determine the effect of these tax changeswe now consider
the actual marginal rates faced by given segments of the population.
We now present marginal tax rates from a sample of returns in Table2.3
calculated by Steverle and Hartzmark (1981) in a very usefulpaper. Of course,
the tax rates correspond to total income rather than just labor incomewhich was
considered in Table 2.2. The significant rise in the progressivity of the
Table 2.2
Federal Income Tax: Selected Marginal Rates
Taxable
Income 150 1960 197 1980 j9542
(1000's) (1.0,3.3) (1.23,5.6) (1.61,9.8) (3.42,21.0)
2—4 22 22 19 16 12
6—8 30 30 26 21 16
10—12 38 38 33 26 20
16-18 50 50 43 40 30
20—22 56 56 49 43 23
26—32 62 62 54 50* 38
38—44 69 69 59 50 42
50—60 75 75 64 50 46
60—70 78 76 66 50 48
70-80 81 81 68 50 48
80—90 84 84 70 50 49
90-100 87 87 71 50 50
100-150 89 89 72 50 50
150—200 90 90 72 50 5023 Table2.2 (Continued)
1lncludes 2.5% surtax.
2The 1984 rates reflect the entire 25%tax reduction passed by Congress in1981. The tax will then be indexed.
tMaximum tax on earned (labor) income was 50%beginning in 1972 imder the mx Reform Act of 1969.
3First entry is CPI in 1950 dollars andsecond entry is median family income in
thousands of current dollars.
income tax in the 1960-1980 period is evident in Table2.3. Note that for those
Table 2.3
Marginal Rates of Taxation on Personal Income




Tax Returns 1961 1969* 1974 1979 Year Rate Included
1% .00 .oo .00 .00 195015.2 —-
5% .00 .00 .00 .00 1955 16.3 --
10% .00 .00 .00 .00 1960 16.4 19.4 25% .18 .15 .15 .14 196514.0 17.6 50% .18 .23 .20 .20 197017.2 22.0
75% .22 .25 .22 .24 197517.4 23.3 90% .22 .28 .28 .32
95% .26 .32 .32 .38
99% .38 .47 .47 .50
lncludesan approximation for surtax changed in 1969.
**From Seater (1982).
households which paid tax, the marginal ratewas between .18 and .26 up through
the 95% percentile. In fact 59% of all taxpayerswho had a non zero marginal
rate, had a rate of 18%. While the marginal rate for the medianreturn increased
by 10% between1961and 1979, the difference in rates on the interquantilerange
increasedby33%. Thisconsiderable increase in the progressj.rity of the24
marginal tax rates will significantly decrease by the taxlegislation changes of
1981.
Another historical comparison of marginal tax rates isprovided by Seater
(1982) who based his estimates on the Statistics of Incomerather than a sample
of individual returns. Except for theyears ¶964—6? when the Kennedy cut lowered
tax rates the movement of the average marginal tax rate hasincreased over the
period 1950—1980. When the effects of the payroll tax are includedthe increase
is from an average marginal tax rate of about 15% in1950 to an average rat.e of
over 23% in 1975 which is an increase of 43% in the 25year period. Therefore,
the increases in the payroll tax over the period havea large effect on the
marginal tax rates.
State income taxes (including the District of Columbia)should also be
briefly mentioned. In 1980 nine states did not tax earned incorue butthe other
42 states have either progressive of proportional taxsystems. Sixteen states
permit deduction of federal income taxes. Among the states withprogressive tax
systems Delaware has the highest overall marginal tax rate of19.8%. However, at
$15,000 after personal exemptions the marginal rate in Californiais 10%, in
Hawaii it is 10%, in Minnesota it is 14%, in New York stateit is 10%, in Oregon
the marginal tax rate is 10% above $15,000, and in Wisconsinthe marginal rate is
11.4% at$l5,000. Nebraska, Rhode Island and Vermontare the only states which
take a constant percentage from the federal taxespaid. Rhode Island takes the
highest proportion, 17%. Among states with proportional rates afterpersonal
exemptions Illinois has a rate of 2.5%, Massachusetts has a rate of 5.4% and
Indiana and Pennsylvania have rates of 2%. Stategovernments have increasingly
turned to direct taxation as a source of revenueover the past 20 years.25
Beside the operation of the Federal tax system, anotherpotentially more
important influence on labor supply of female heads of householdis the AFDC tar
and transfer system. It has often been contended that A}'DCpresents a
significant disincentive to labor supply, and its replaceme;tby NIT could
significantly decrease the work disincentive. The basic design of AFDCprograms
is a transfer payment which depends on family sizeaccompanied by a tax rate of
67%until the breakeven point is reached and theperson returnsto the federal
tax system.A sizeable nonconvexity is created because at the breakevenpoint
the marginal tax rate decreases from .67 toapproximately .16. Thus, the
potential discincentive effect is quite large.6States differ in the size of the
transfer payment and alsoin the exactoperation of the AFDC tax system. The
majority of the states permit $30 of earned income per month beforestarting to
levy the .67 tax. Thus, in Figure 2.1 we show the basic outline of theAFDC
budget set. Breakeven hours H may not be reached even by women whowork full




The workings of NIT tarsystems resemble AFDC as in Figure2.1 although no
earnings disregard exists. Major differences
are eligibility, since all families
would qualify, and benefit and taxparameters. The NIT guarantee isa function
of the povery limit whichdepends on family size and the localcost of living.
The guarantee has been set atbetween .75 Sd 1.25 times thepoverty limit in the
NIT experiments. For instancein Indiana .75 times thepoverty limit was 28
higher than the AFDC payment for
non-labor force participation fora family of
four. Thus the NIT guarantee
i typically more generous than theAFDC payment.
The marginal tax rateup to breakeven hours is also lowered from.67 to a value
between .4 and .6.The budget set has thenonconvex form of Figure 2.2 where
beyond breakeven hours, i{,theindividual returns to the federaltar system. At
breakeven hours the marginal tax
rate falls from .4 and .7 toaround .25 when
federal taxes and PICA areaccounted for. For male heads of householdswith good





hours will be reached at about 120 hoursper month of work. For males on very
generous plans or those with low wages, breakeven costs will not be reachedeven
for high hours of work. Likewise, for female headsof household the majority
will not reach breakeven hours because of theirrelatively low wages. Thus the
position of the first tax segment and the nonconventy created at 1hoursmay
have a significant influence on labor supply decisions.
The last tax system we consider is theoperation of the social security
earnings test for individuals between 62 and 70 years old whoare receiving.
social security benefits. The budget set has exactly thesame form as the
operation of AFDC in Figure 2.1. A level of benefits and familycomposition. An
'earnings disregard' then exists up to an amount which determines
H1 hours.
Beyondhours earnings are taxed at a rate of .5 until breakevenhours itare
reached. Thus, we again seem to have a possibly large disincentiveto working.7
But, this diagram leaves out a potentially important effect whichBlinder,
Gordon,and Wise (1980) point out. The effect is that currentearnings will
replace lower previous earnings which are used to computeaverage monthly
earnings which the benefit level is partly based on. Especially with thelow
levels of previous FICA amounts, current earnings couldreplace the $3,600 level
in force from 1951—1954 and for about 20% ofnear retirement workers replace
previous zero PICA earnings years. Thus, if individuals understand the
admittedly extremely complex social security benefit formulas, the work
disincentives can be greatly diminished. Blinder, Gordon, and Wiseactually give
an example where the earnings test is more than compensated foras a work
incentive exists. Thus, empirical studies which use historicaldata may have28
great difficulty in adequately representing the correctbudget set. The indexing
provision of the 1977 Social Security Amendments greatly lowers thequantitative
significance of earnings replacement. However, the disincentiveseffect of the
earnings test is still diminished. The intertemporal aspects of theinteraction
of social security and the retirement decisionprobably require a more complex
model than our essentially one period representation of thebudget set. While
the problem is quite difficult to represent ina model, social security may have
a significant effect on retirement.8
In this section we have discussed the effect of Federaland state tax
systems on the budget set. While federal tax rates areuniformly progressive,
nonconvexities still exist in the budget set due to thepresence of the standard
deducticn, earned income credit, and FICA contributions. State incometax and
AFDC programs are also discussed. Next the NIT taxsystem and its relation to
AFDC is considered. Lastly, the budget set for the socialsecurity earnings test
and the complex intertempora]. aspects of retirementare outlined. In this last
area further work seems required to extend the laborsupply model to account for
intertemporal decisions.29
NOTES
Here we discuss our procedure forjoint returns. We followed similar
procedures for single persons and heads ofhouseholds but do not report the details here.
2 Tablesexclude the zero bracket amountfor the standard deduction.
However, empirical work by Hausman (igam)did not indicate that the nonconvexjtjes created by the earned incomecredit and FICA had an important influence on the econometric estimates.
LTaxlaw changes in 1981 provide forexclusion from taxation of 10%ofthe secondary worker's earnings up to $30,000beginning in 1983. This changegreatly increase the neutrality of the taxsystem towards married persons.
The tax rates are taken from TaxFoundation (1981).
6 Undercurrent legislation in certaincases the tax rate is 100%.An importantdistinction exists between thestatutory tax rate and the effective tax ratebecause of various allowable deductions.
Moffitt (1981) estimates the effective AFDC tax rates overa sample of recipients.
If the individual is eligibleto receive benefits but continuesworking without receiving benefits, hisfuture benefits are increasedby an approximately actuarily fair amount between theages of 62 and 65. The adjustment forages 65— 70 is Considerably less.
8 TheBlinder et al. conclusions have been
challenged by Burkhauser and Turner (1981); a reply isgiven byBlinder et al. (1981). Forempirical estimates of the effect of social
security or retirement see Gordon and Blinder
(1980), Boskin and liurd (1982),Burtless and !1offitt (1982) andDiamond and Hausman (1982). These resultsarereviewedin the last section of thepaper.30
3.The Econometrics of Labor Supply with Taxes
The essential feature which distinguisheseconometric models of labor supply
with taxes from traditional demand models is thenon-constancy of the net, after
tax wage.' Except for the case of aproportional tax system, the net wage
depends on hours worked because of the operation of the taxsystem. Also the
marginal net wage depends on the specific budget segment thatthe individual's
indifference curve is tangent to. Thus, econometrictechniques need to be -
devisedwhich can treat the nonlinearity of thebudget set. However, it is
important to note at the outset that a simultaneousequation problem does not
really exist, even though the net wage received dependson hours worked.
Given a market wage which is constantover hours worked and a tax system which is
given exogenously by the government, the nonlinearbudget set faced by the
individual in deciding on his preferred hours of workis determined exogenously
to his choice.2 An econometric model needs to takethe exogenous nonlinear
budget set and to explain the individual choice of desiredhours. We first
describe such a model for convex and nonconvexbudget sets. As expected, the
convex case is simpler to deal with. lie then considerother issues of model
specification such as variation in tastes, fixed costs toworking, and quantity
constraints on available labor supply.
Econometric estimation is quite straightforward in thecase of a convex
budget set. Since a unique tangency or a corner solution atzero hours will
determine desired hours of work, we need only determinewhere the tangency
occurs. To do so we begin with a slight generalization of theusual type of
labor supply specification31
(3.1)h (w,y,z,) = ht +
wherew is a vector of net wages, y is a vector of virtualincome, z are
individual socioeconomic variables, is the unknownvectorof coefficients
assumed fixed over the population, and c is a stochastic termwhich represents
the divergence between desired hours h'and actualhours. The typical
specificationthat has been used in () islinear or log linear and scalar w and
y corresponding to the market wage and nonlabor income. The stochasticterm is
assumed to have classical properties so that noquantity constrainta on hours
worked exist. However, 0 C ii( Bwhere I-i is a physical maxinum to hours worked.
We also assuuie that when the's are estimated that the Slutsky conditionsare
satisfied so that () arisesfrom concave preferences.
The problem to be solved is to find h* when the individualis faced with the
convex budget set, B1 for in,...,m.3To find h* we take the specification of
desired hours on a given budget segment B.
(3.2)hi =g(w1,y.,z,)
Calculate hiandif0h7 C H1 wherethe Hi's are kink point hours in Figure 1.2
thenh! is feasible and represents the unique tangency ofthe indifference curves
and the budget set. However, if h lies outside theinterval (0,H.) it is not
feasible so we move on to try the next budget segmçnt. If
H1 < h c H2 we again
would have the unique optimum.If we have bracketed the kink point so that
) H and h < H1, then h* = B1 so that desired hours fallat the kink point.
Otherwise we go on and calculate h. By trying •out all thesegments we will
either find a tangency or find thathi C H1 for all i in which case h* = 0 or
> Hr for all i in which case h*H. Then a nonlinear leastsquares procedure32
or Tobit procedure to take account of minimum hours at zero should be usedto
compute the unimownparameters. The statistical procedure would basically
N
minimize the sum of(ha— h)2 where j represents individuals in the sample)4
j =1
Perhaps a better technique would be to use Tobit which enforces the constraint
that h. 0.
3
Thecase of the nonconvex budget set as in Figure 1.5 or Figure 1.6 ismore
complicated because equation (2.2) can lead to more than one feasibletangency
which leads to many potential h!'s. How can we decide which of thesefeasible
h!'s is the global optimum? Burtless—Hausman (1978) initially demonstratedthe
technique of working backwards from the labor supply specification ofequation
(2.2) to the underlying preferences which can be represented by autility
function.5 The basic idea to make use of Roy's identity whichgenerated the
labor supply function from the indirect utility function v(w.,y.)
ov(w.,y.) Ov(w.,y.) 1/
1= hI=g(w.,y.,z,p)
along a given budget segment. So long as the Slutsky condition holds then
v(w,y1) can always be recovered by solving the differential equation (2.3). In
fact, v( ) often has a quite simple closed form for comnonly used labor supply
specifications. For the linear supply specification
(3.4)h7aw+py+vy
Hausman (1980) solved for the indirect utility function
(3.5)v(w.,y.) ei(y+._. w
— +33
Given the indirect utility function, all of the feasibletangencies can be
compared, and the tangency with highest utility is chosen as the preferred hours
of work, h*.6 Then as with the convex budget setcase, we can use either
nonlinear least squares or a Tobit procedure to estimate the unimown
coefficients.While using a specific parameterization of the utility function
seems upsetting to some people, it should be realized that writing down a labor
supply function as jn equation (2.2) is equivalent to writing down autility
function under the assumption of utility maximization. To the extent that the
labor supply specification yields a robust approrimation to thedata, the
associated utility function will also provide a good approximation to the
underlying preferences. The utility function allows us to make the global
comparisons to determine the preferred hours of labor supply. Th convexcase
needs only local comparisons, but the nonconvex case requiresglobal comparisons
because of the possibility of multiple tangencies of indifferencecurves with the
budget set.
We next introduce the possibility of variation in tastes. In thelabor
s,zpply specification of equation (2.1), all individuals are assumed to have
identical 'a so that the variation of observationally equivalent individuals
must arise solely from c .However,empirical studies seemed to do an inadequate
job of explaining observed hours of workunderthe assumption of the
representative individual. Burtless-Hausman (1978) allowed for variation in
preferences by permittingto be randomly distributed in the population. Their
results indicated that variation inseemed more important than variation in a34
They also found that variation in B represented approximately B timesas much of
the unexplained variance as did variation in .Hausman(1981) also found
parameter variation to be an important part of his econometricspecification.
Blomquist (1982) tests for and rejects the constant preference (noparameter
variation) model. However, his results on terms of policy interestare quite
similar whether or not preference variation is specified. Aneven more
satisfactory procedure would be to allow all the taste coefficients tovary in
the population. At present the requirement of evaluatingmultiple integrals over
nonrectangular regions for the more general specification has led to use of the
simple case of one or two taste coefficients varying. Further research isneeded
to determine whether this more complex specification would bean important
improvement over current models. Hausman (19a2) uses panel data to allow for
general preference variation by conditioning on individual coefficients.
Estimates of separate coefficients for each individualcan be accomplished using
the time series aspect of the data. The need for distributionalassumptions or
the varying parameter is also eliminated.
Another consideration which can have an important effecton the budget set
for women's labor force participation is fixed costs to working.Transportation
costs, the presence of young children, and search costs of finding a job allcan
lead to a fixed cost element in the labor supply deéision. The basic effectof
fixed costs is to introduce a nonconvexity in the budget set at the
Thus, even if the original budget is convex as in Figure 1.2 thepresence of
fixed costs leads to a minimum number of hoursH0, which depends on the wage,
below which an individual will not choose to work. In Figure 3.1nonlabor income
is y1 with the original convex budget set drawn by the dotted line.However,35
3'
Figure3.1
presence of fixed costs lowers the effective budget set to the pointy1- 70. The
individual wou'd not choose to work less thanH0 hours because she would be
better off at zero hours. This nonconvexity invalidates thesimple reservation
wage theory of labor force participation since hours also need to be accounted
for. Hausman (1980),(1ge1) has found average fixed costs to beon the order of
$100 per month. The importance of fixed costs could explain the often noted
empirical fact that veryfewindividuals are observed working less than ten or
fjfteen hours per week.9
Ye flow turn to the question of quantity constraints whichseems to enter
labor supfly models in two possible ways. The first type of quantity constraint
might arise if an individual has the choice of working either full time,say 40
hours per week, or not working at all. We can still estimate theparameters of
-4
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his labor supply function by discrete choice modelswhich allow a distribution of
preferences, e.g., Hausrzan—Wise (1978), Zabalza et.al. (1980).For example,
suppose we begin with the linear labor supply specification h! =aw.+aw.+Zr
along with the associated indirect utility function ofequation (2.5). To
compare indirect utility at zero and forty hours we need tospecify w.and y. that
would lead to the appropriate number of hoursbeing chosen in an unconstrained
setting.10 But w. and y. can be solved forby using the desired hours supply
equation and the linear equation through the point thatgives net, after tax,
earnings for that number of hours of work. For forty hours theequation is E40=
w.. 40 +y.where arises from the budget set. We can solve the twoequations
in two unknoms for w. andy aS use the values for the required comparison so
that a,, andy can be estimated. It turns out that thisprocedure is equivalent
to solving for the direct utility function whereonly quantities appear so that
quantity constraints enter in a straightforward manner. Forinstance, the direct
utility function for our example is
(3.6)u(h,x) -(h-s-) exp [1-y(x +!LEflA h)] p I p
wherex is consumption of the composite commodity. However, the directutility
function need not exist in closed form in which case theprevious solution
procedure can be used with the indirect utility function, Ofcourse,
specification of a direct utility function could be done ab initio, but itmight
not be easily combined with the labor supply functions ofunconstrained
individuals.37
The other type of quantity constraints whichpeople 8eem to have in mind is
the choice among jobs, each of whichcomes with a distinct market wage and hours
of work combination. However, if theindividual takes a given job he is
constrained to work the given number of hours whichcome with the job. Again a
discrete choice framework seems apprpriate tomodel this situation. Use of
either the indirect or direct utility functionwould allow the appropriate
utility comparisons to be made. We would need to Imaw therange of choices which
a given individual faces. But the choice setmight be either established by
survey questions or estimated from a data set of choices of similarindividuals.
At this point we have strayed rather far frontour original theory of flexible
hours of work. In our empirical estimationwe have not accounted for the
possibility of quantity constraints. it seems unclear hot'iimportant an empirical
problem quantity constraints are. As we discusslater, even conditional on
working in a given week the standard deviation of hoursworked for prime age
males is around 14 hours. Thus, the model offlexible labor supply with fixed
costs may provide a reasonably goodapproximation, especially in the long run.11
A question of some interest might be whatare the direction of biases in
estimated labor supply models which do not accountfor taxes? Given the
complexity of a model which incorporates taxes, theanswer isnotstraightforward
although a partial solution is possible. Consider thelinear labor supply
specification of equation (2.4). The netwage for individual i on budget segment
and the corresponding virtual income,y1., are determined simultaneously
withthe unknown coefficients a ,, andy .Supposethat the market wage w. and
observed non—labor income, x., are used instead. Ifx is measured subject to
error, which it almost surely is in any survey, then the estimatedcoefficient38
forwill be subject to errors in variables bias towardszero. As an
approximation assume that the contribution of virtual income,'ij' is omitted so
that it enters the stochastic disturbance. Since the newage w1 and virtual
income are positively correlated due to progressive taxes and< 0 if
leisure is a normaJ. good, the estimate of thewage coefficient will have a
negative bias.In fact, empirical studies of males which do notaccount for
taxes typically estimate a to be negative and substantial.12On the other hand,
estimates which accoaunt for taxes,e.g., Burtless—Hausnian (1978), Wales—Woodland
(1979), Hausman (1981), Ashworth—Ulph (1981),Blomquist (1982), Hausman (1982),
estimate a to be much nearer to zero. These latter studiesalso find
considerably more evidence in support of economic theory than dostudies which
ignore taxes and after find compensated demand curves whichslope in the wrong
direction.
For labor supply estimates for wives, the husband'sbefore tax income is
often used for in equation (2.4). Then two counteracting biasesas present in
estimates of the wage parameter a. If the wife'swage is positively correlated
with husband's income then a negative bias of the estimateof a is created.
However, the bias from the income term turns out to bepositive so that the net
effect cannot be determined. To the extent that husband'sbefore tax income is
fairly close to the wive's virtual income the effect of the biasshould not be as
itnortant as in the husband's case. The empiricalevidence to date supports this
tentative conclusion.
In this section we have demonstrated how thenonlinearity of the budget set
which taxes create can be accounted for in an econometricmodel. The labor
supply (leisure demand) curves are still the focus of modelspecification. For
the convex budget set case the only newcomplication is to search for the budget39
segmenton which h* falls. When the budget set is nonconvex, we need tosolve
for the indirect utility function which is associated with thelabor supply
specification. Then the multiple tangencies of the budget set andindifference
curves can be compared to find the h*whichcorresponds to maxinumutility.We
alsoemphasized the potential importance of allowing for variation inpreferences
and fixed costs to working. Previous empirical studies indicatethe potential
importanceof both considerations. Lastly, we discuss techniques tohandle
quantity constraints within the context of our approach. However, unlesson a
priori grounds we know who in the sample is quantity constrained,it is not clear
that these procedures can be applied in a givensample.40
NOTES
1
Nonconstan-t prices do exist in the demand for othergoods, e.g., electricity with a declining block rate. Ageneral treatment of econometric
techniques for nonlinear budget sets is givenby Hausruan (1982).
An initial work on introducing taxes into laborsupply mode]s, Hall
(1973) used the observed after taxwage which creates simultaneous eouation bias
in the estimated coefficients. Wales (1973),Hausman and Wise (1976) andRose
(1976)introduced instrumental variable techniques totake account of this problem.
2If the market wage depends on hours worked thesame reasoning holds sincethe budget set is still exogenous.
The technique used here is more fullyexplained in Hausrnan (1979b). See
also Hausman (1981) and Hausman (1982).
A potential problem does exist in theasymptotic expansions used to
compute the standard errors of the coefficients.
Their work was done in the framework of laborsupply and a composite
consumption good. The technique can also be used in themany good case although it is more difficult to apply.Alternatiuvely, one can begin with a utility
function specification and derive the laborsupply function as Wales—Woodland
(1979), Ashworth—Ulph (1981), and Ruffell (1981)did.
The indirect utility function can be used toevaluate tangencies on both
budget segments and at kink points so that the directutility function is
unnecessary. See Hausman (1980) or Deaton-Muellbauer (1981) fortechniques to be
used here. As Figure 1.8 shows a tangencywill not occur at a nonconvex kink
point, but it may occur later on a convex portion of thebudget set.
For many linear regression specifications wherethe effect of taxes are
not accounted for, variations in preferencesleads only to an efficiency issue
for the econometric estimator. However, taxescreate an essential nonlinearity
in the problem so that variation inpreferences can he quite important. A
similar issue arises in the specification of discretechoice models, e.g.,
Hausman—Wise (1978). Greenberg and Kosters (1973)seemed to be the first paper
that allowed for a dispersion of preferences toaffect their model in an
importantway.
-
It is interesting to note that Greenberg—Kostershad a similar type of
variation in preferences. However, they did not allowfor the effect of taxes so
that the results cannot be compared.
Similar results in a model without taxeswere found by Cogan (1981).
Hanoch (1980) and Nakarnura and Nakamura (i9ai) havealso included fixed costs mb
models of female labor supply.
Neary and Roberts (1980) and Deaton and Nuellbauer (isso) discussthis
technique in a general demand setting. However,they do not consider the effect of taxes.41
Ham (1981), in a model without taxes, attempts to provide evidenceon
quantity constraints by considering the response to a survey question on the
possibility of additional work. Deaton (1981) considers quantity constraints by
a rationing model of the consumption function.
12 }!eckman—Borjes (1979)present a range of estimates. Despite its title
the paper should not be used for policy purposes since all the studies reviewed
ignore taxes in their models of labor supply.42
4.Results
In this section we summarize the results of studies of laborsupply which
take account of taxes. The effect of taxes on both laborsupply and economic
welfare is considered. However, difficulties arise inproviding convenient
summary measures for the effect of taxes. Elasticity measures for labor
supply,
which are most often used as summary measures in demandstudies, are not fully
adequate to assess the effect of taxation for the following reasons:(1)
Nonlinearity of the budget sets can lead to large changes in laborsupply with
small changes in taxes. The nonconvexity ofmany of the budget sets leads to
this result. (2) About 1/2 of all women are not labor forceparticipants.
Because of the non—tangency of their utility functions with thebudget sets at
zero hours, small changes in taxes will not effect most non—workers. (3)When
taxesare changed both the change in the net after taxwages and the virtual
incomes must be taken account of. Equation (1.2) demonstrates the correct
relationship.(4) If variation in preferences are specified,e.g., Burtless—
Hausman (1978), Hausman (1981,19a2), and Blomuist (1982), behaviorof 'mean'
individual may differ from the mean population response.1This difference arises
fromthe nonlinearity of the budget set. To some extent problems whicharise
with the first and last reason are decreased by aggregation from individual
responsesto the population. However, the middle two problems remain..
A.Prime Age Males: These individuals are usually taken to be from 25to
either35or60 years old. Labor force participationamong this group is nearly
100%, especially when disabled individuals are not considered. Unemployment is
typically low among this group in a non-recession year. Most studiestherefore43
donot account specifically for unemployment or constraintson labor market
activity.2 An integration of behavior whenunemployed and hours of work should
be a goal of future research, but theoretical advancesas well as better data
would be required.3 Another needed advance is anintegrated model of family
labor supply with taxesd to take account of wives labormarket activity and its
possible effect on husband's labor market
The most natural interpretation of the laborsupply results estimated on
cross section data is an equilibrium model where actual hours differfrom desired
hours because of stochastic reasons. One should notmaintain the incorrect image
of the prime age male labor free uniformly at work for40hours per week and 2000
hours per year. On the company,- significant variationexists in both normal
hours per week and weeks worked per year. Hoursper week of work, conditional on
being employed, typically have a mean of about 42 hours witha standard deviation
of 10—15 hours in typical cross section date.5 Menpresumably choose jobs which
have the number of hours which most closelycorrespond to their desired hours
taking account of over time and possible layoffs. However, fora significant
proportion of the prime age male population, changes betweenemployers is fairly
rare, see Hall (1982). How much of the year to year variation in laborsupply
for this group arises from fluctuations in their marketwage is problematical.
Therefore, the models of labor supply and empirical resultspresented here are
probably less relevant for short term labor supply response to businesscycle
conditions.
We consider from sets of results for primeage males: Wales—Woodland
(1979), Ashworth and Ulph (1981), Hausman (1981),Blomquist (1982), and Hausman
(1982).6 The results are given in Table 4.1. First, note thatthe44
TABLE4.1
Prime Age MaleLabor Supply Results
Wage Income
Authors Data Model Elasticity Elasticity
1. Wales—Woodland PSID CES .09** _.1I**
2. Ashworth—Ulph UK Generalized CES -.13 —.05
3.}1aueman' PSID Linear .00 -.1? 4. Blomquist* Sweden Linear .08 —.04
5.Hausman PSID Linear .03 -.14
*Specification permits variation in preferences. Mean results are given.
'Results are approximate since means of data were not given.
uncompensated labor supply elasticity is much closer to zero than is typically
found in labor supply studies which ignore taxes. This resultconcurs with the
econometric bias arguments given in the last section. The next difference is
that the income elasticities vary from —.04 to —.17 which imply that leisureis a
normal good in contrast to many studies which ignore taxes and find theopposite
sign. Given the magnitude of virtual income with progressive taxation, the clear
implication is that taxes will affect the labor supply decision. The combination
of these two results leads to the last result, which is perhaps the most
satisfying. All five studies imply a positive compensated wage elasticity so
that the compensated labor supply curve is upward sloping. These resultsare in
stark contrast to models which ignore taxation, and very often estimate a
compensated elasticity of the wrong sign. This finding is difficult, if not
impossible, to justify even when more general models of labor supply are
considered. Since a non—negative compensated elasticity is the only implication
of economic theory for models of labor supply, it is satisfying to find that the45
results become acceptable to the theory when the effectof taxes is taken into
account.
We now turn to the effect of taxes on laborsupply. As equations (i.i) and
(1.2) demonstrate, the theoretical effect is indeterminate.Nost models for
prime age males which ignore taxes estimate a backwardbending labor supply
curve.7 Therefore, a reduction in taxrates which has recently occurred in the
U.S. andU.K.would lead to a reduction in hours of work. Acontrary view has
been put forward by 'supply side' advocates in the U.S.who have argued that a
reduction in tax rates will lead to such a large increasein labor supply that
government revenue would actually increase.
We first present some results of Hausman (1981a,1981b)for the U.S. He
found using 1975 data that compared to a no taxsituation, desired labor supply
was 8.2% lower because of the U.S. tax system, including PICA taxesand state
income taxes. In Table 4.2 the results are givenby wage quintiles from the PSID
sample. In the second row the change from the no tax situation isgiven. Note
that the effect of the progressiveness of the taxsystemis to cause high wage
individuals to reduce their labor supply more from theno tax situation than do
TABLE 4.2
The Effect of Taxes on Prime Age Male Labor Supply in theU.S.
Narket Wage $3.15 $4.72 $5.87 $7.06 $10.01
Change in -4.5% —6.5% -8.5% -10.1% -12.8% Labor Supply
10% Tax Cut +.4% +,% + .9% +1.7% +1.47%
30% Tax Cut +1.3% ÷1.6% +2.7% +3.1% +4.6%46
low tax individuals. The higher marginal tax rates lead to highervirtual income
and a greater reduction in desired labor supply. Ofcourse, this pattern of
labor supply has an adverse effect on tax revenues because of thehigher tax
rates that high income individuals pay tax at. In the second and thirdrows of
Table 4.2 we present the expected change in labor supply for tax cutsof 10% and
30%. Note that desired labor supply increases with a tax reduction. We findthe
expected pattern that the effect on high wage individuals is greatest since the
linear labor supply model used has an increasing elasticity with virtualincome.
The effect of a 30% tax cut is roughly three times as large asa 10% cut, but the
ratios are not exact. However, neither of the two tax cuts isnearly self—
financing as Hausman's (1981b) results indicate.
Lastly, we consider two types of radical tax reform. We consider a
progressive linear income tax with all current deductions removed,e.g., interest
deductability. Therefore, we have broadened the tax base considerably and then
determined the tax rate which would raise the same amount of taxrevenue as the
current U.S. tax system using 1975 data. With a zero exemption levelso that a
flat tax results, the required tax rate is 14.6%. Desired laborsupply for the
prime age males rises about 8.1%. For a progressive tax with an exemption level
of $4000 (1975 dollars), the required tax rate rises to 20%. Desired labor
supply increases by about 7.7%. Therefore, a decrease in marginal tax rates does
lead to an increase in desired labor supply of significant amounts although much
of the progressivity of the tax system is lost with such a proposed tax reform.
Ashworth and Ulph (1981) also considered the effect of tax changes on labor
supply. They considered changing the standard rate of tax in the U.K. from its
present value of 30% to 4 other rates representing changes of plus or minus 7%47
and 15%. The standard rate of tax is themarginal tax rate for almost 90% of
prime age males in the U.K. In Table 4.3 the percentagechange in labor supply
is given for the entire sample as wellas for each quintile of the income (not
wage) distribution.8
TABLE 4.3
The Effect of Tax Rate Changes on Prime Age Male LaborSupply in the U.K.
Income Quintjle 1 2 3 4 5 Total
15% Tax Cut —.3% +.7% +.8% +1.6% +2.1% +1.8% 7% Tax Cut —.1% +.3% +.3% +.9% +.9% +
7% TaxRise +.1% —.5% -1.0% -.9% - .g% —1.2% 15% Tax Rise +•3% —1.1% —2.3% —2.6% —2.1% —2.9%
Note the qualitative similarity betveen theAshworth-Ulph results and the Hausman
results. A much larger change in labor supply is forecastfrom the higher income
.quintiles. The magnitude of the predicted changes also do notdiffer too much,
although Ashworth—Tilph find that the income effect dominates inthe lowest
quintile, leading to a small decrease in labor supply when taxesare lowered.
The labor supply changes given in Table 4.3are not sufficient to make a tax cut
self—financing.The rise in labor supply would offset about 10% of thefall in
revenues from the tax cut which isagain fairly close to what Hausman (1981b)
found.
Thelast set of results which we consider are Blomquist's(1982) estimates
for Sweden. Using 1973 data, he calculates the effect oftaxes on labor supply
for the mean individual at wage rates of 10.0skr, 20.3 skr, and 40.0 skr which




The Effect of Taxes on Prime Age Males in Sweden
Market Wage (Skr) 10.0 20.3 40.0 Total Sample
Change in Labor Supply —4.7%—13.6%-27.1% -13.1%
Proportional Tax —1.9%+6.2%+11.4% +6.9%
In Table 4.4 the first row estimates the change in labor supply from the no tax
situation. Note that the results are almost twice as largeas the estimates for
the U.S. in Table 4.2. Much of this difference arises from theconsiderably
higher level of taxation in Sweden. In the second row of Table 4.4an equal
yield proportional tax is considered for each of the 'representative' males. The
corresponding tax rates are 27.8%, 39.1%, and 47.8% respectively. For the entire
sample the equal yield proportional tax is 34% with desired labor supply
increasing 6.9% from its current level. Blonquists' estimates indicatea
substantial effect of taxes on labor supply in Sweden.
B.Economic Welfare: The welfare cost of the distortion createdby the
composition of a tax is measured by use of deadweight loss (excess burden): We
briefly sketch the theory of the deadweight loss measure, and then wepresent
estimates which arise from labor supply studies.9 The firstcomponent of a
welfare measure is the effect of the tax on individualutility. Here the
measure long used by economists has been some form of consumers' surplus.
Consumers' surplus corresponds to the concept of how muchmoney each individual
would need to be given, after imposition of the tax, to be made as well offas49
hewasinthe no tar situation. Measurement of consumers'surplus often is done
by the size of a trapezoid under the individual's demand curveor here it would
be the labor supply curve. But Hausman (1981c) has demonstratedthat in the case
of labor supply this method is very inaccurate, Instead thetheoretically
correct notion of either the compensating variation or equivalentvariation must
be used.1° These measures, set forth by Sir John Hicks,are probably best
defined in terms of the expenditure function. The expenditurefunction
determines the minimum amount of money an individual needs to attaina given
level of utility at given levels of wagges and prices.11 Its formis determined
by either the direct utility function U(H,Y) or the labor supply function.
Consider the simple example of the wage tax for which thecompensating variation
equals
(4.1) C.V.(w,w',U) =e(w',tJ)—e(w,U)
Equation (4.1) states that the welfare loss to the individual, measured in
dollars of the consumption good, equals the minimum amount ofnon—labor income
needed to keep the individual at his original utility level U minushis non—labor
income in the no tar situation, y.Since utility is kept at the pre—tax level U,
the compensating variation arises solely from the subtitution effectin the
Slutsky equation (1.1). The income effect is eliminated because the individual
iskept onhis initial indifference curve. In the more complicatedcase of
progressivetaxes, the only difference isthatwe use virtual non—labor incomes
inequation (4.1) rather than actual non—labor income.12
We need one more ingredient to complete the measure of the welfare lossfrom
taxation. The government has raised tax revenue, and we need tomeasure the50
contributionto individual welfare which arises from the
governnerit snending the
taxrevenue.The assumption commonly used is that thegovernment returns the tax
Figure 4.1
y
revenue to the individual via an income transfer. Here itwould correspond to
increasingthe individual's non—labor income by the amount oftax revenue raised.





Equation (4.2) states that the deadweight loss of a taxequals the amount the
individual needs to be given to be as well off after thetax as he was before the
tax minus the tax revenue raised T(w,w',TJ).l3Deadweight loss is greater than or
equal to zero which makes sense given that we expect taxationalways to have an







variation gives the welfare loss to the individual. In Figure 4.1 the
compensating variation and deadweight loss are shown in terms of our simplewage
tax example of Figure 1.2. Here the effect of the tax is to reducelabor supply
from H* to H'. The compensating variation is measured by the linesegment yy'.
We then decompose the compensating variation into its twoparts. The line
segment CD measures tax revenue collected while the line CE measures the
deadweight loss of the tax. Since the taxpayer has been made worse off butno
one has benefited from the amount of the deadweight loss, it represents tIe
economic cost of raising the tax revenue.
In Table 4.5 we present Hausman's results from deadweight loss of taxation
TABLE 4.5
Deadweight Loss Estimates for Prime Age Male in the U.S.
Market Wage $3.15 $4.72 $5.87 $7.06 $10.02 Total
DWL/Tax Revenue 9.4% 14.4% 19.0% 23.7% 39.5% 22.1% 10% Tax Cut 8.5% 13.3% 17.4% 21.8% 36.1% 19.0%
30% TAxCut 6.8% 10.9% 14.5% 17.9% 29.5 15.4%
of labor supply in the U.S. The first row gives the deadweight loss in each of
the wage quntiles. Note that the deadweight loss to tax revenue ratio rises
sharply because of the progressivity of the income tax. The 'triangle formula'
for deadweight loss demonstrates that the loss is proportional to thesquare of
the tax rate so that higher wage individuals face a higher economic distortion.
Overall, Hausman estimates the mean ratio of deadweight loss tb tax revenue to be
22.1% which has important implications given the large proportion of the U.S. tax
revenues which are raised via the income tax. The next two rows of Table 4.5
calculate the deadweight loss under two tax cut proposals to given52
an indication of the size of the marginal change. Lastly, we consider the
deadweight loss under an equal yield proportional tax. With no exemption and a
tax rate of 14.6% the deadweight loss to tax revenue ratio decline to 7.1%.A
progressive linear income tax of 20.7% with an exemption level of $4000 leads to
a ratio of 14.5%. Both sets of calculations indicate the size of the welfare
cost which arises from the progressivity of the U.S. tax system.
Blomquist (1982) does similar deadweight loss calculations for Sweden. For
the average individual in his sample who earns 20.3 51cr he calculates the
deadweight loss to tax ratio to be 14Z. The marginal tax rate faced by this
individual is 62%. An equal yield proportional tax would be 39% and the
deadweight loss to tax ratio would decline to 5.5%. Over the entire sample
Blomquist calculates that the deadweight loss ratio is 19%. An equal yield
proportional tax of 33.7% would lower the ratio to 4%.
Increased attention in the U.S. and European nations has focused on the
incentive effects of the tax systems. Most of the attention has beenon output
effects. The labor supply results for prime age males reviewed here do
demonstrate that income taxes reduce desired labor supply. The answer to the
question of whether taxes increase or decrease desired labor supply is what most
policy makers worry about. Yet, the deadweight loss effects may be core
important from an economists' viewpoint. Since deadweight loss is a measure of
the economic cost or efficiency effect of the income tax, it provides the
appropriate measure within which to have frame questions about the 'optimal'
progressivity of the tax system or the cost of marginal government expenditure.15
Also, deadweight loss calculations are central to proposals for tax reform
measures. And the deadweight loss question stands apart from labor supply53
effectssince large deadweight loss exists even whencounteracting income and
substitution effects lead to small laborsupply changes. The size of the
deadweight loss associated with the income tax isperhaps the most important
finding of the recent labor supply literature which considersthe effect of
taxes. Deadweight loss calculationsare likely to influence future discussions
on tax changes among economists and perhapspolicy makers as well.
C.Wives: Income taxation is generally thought tohave important effects-on
wives labor force behavior. Wives labor forceparticipation in the U.S. is
approximately 50%. When the labor force participation decisionis made by a
-
womanwhose husband is employed, the tax rate whichenters her decision is
calculated from the husband's earnings.16 Since thismarginal tax rate is around
25% on average, taxes should be expected to beimportant in wives labor supply
decisions.17 Since relatively largeuncompensated wages elasticities are often
estimated for wives, the effect of various taxreform proposals may have
important effects. However, it is important to rememberthat since 50% of wives
do not work, their reaction to marginalchanges in tares will be zero to a great
extent. Wives already at work will change theirdesired hours and some wives
will decide to enter the labor force inresponse to a tax cut, but most
nonparticipants will remai.n so. Therefore, elasticity estimatesshould be used
with caution in considering tax changes.
We consider four sets of estimates for wives'labor supply behavior which
consider the effect of taxation: Ashworth &LTlph (1981) for Great Britain,
Hausman (1981) for the U.S., Nakamura and Nakamura(1981) for Canada andthe
U.S., and }osen (1976) for the U.S. The resultsare given in Table 4.6. The54
TABLE 4.6
Wives Labor Supply Results
Wage Income Authors Data Model ElasticityElasticity
1. Ashworth—Ulph UK Generalized CES .19 -.14 2.Hausman PSID Linear .91 -.50t 3. Nakamura—NakapiuraUS Census Linear _.16*
3a. Nakamura-.Nakaniura Canada Census Linear _.30*
4.Rosen Panes (NLS) Linear 2.3 -.42-*
tEvalatd for mean women whoworks full time at virtual income which includes
husband's earnings.
*For the age group 35—39Youngerage groups have larger elasticities while older
age groups have smaller elasticities.
**Eatimated from results given in thepaper.
estimatesvary widely with the Ashworth-Ulph and Hausman results in therange of
studies which do not account for taxes. Rosen'sestimated wage elasticity of 2.3
seems quite high.Econometric problems which include incorrect treatmentof
virtualincome and an inconsistentestimation technique may explain the
divergence.In subsequent analysis Feenberg—Rosen (1983)have used wage
elasticityestimates of 1.0. The mostsurprising result is that of Nakamura-
Nakamura (1981) who find significant negativeuncompensated wage elasticities
which range from -.39for the 25—29age group to —.06 for the 50-54 age group.
Almost no other econometric study of wives laborsupply, whether or not taxes are
considered, estimates a negative wage elasticity. The Naka;nura-Nakamurapaper
has an incorrect treatment of virtual income togetherwith other econometric
problems. Yet their finding that higher wages lead to lower laborsupply for
wives together with the implication that the effect of incometaxation is to55
increasewives labor supply is so at odds with previous studiesthat it should
perhaps be disregarded unless further studies provide additionalconfirmation.
Theestimated income elasticities are all negativeso that taxation has two
counteracting effects: by decreasing husbands not earningsits increases wives
laborsupply but by its effect on virtual income it decreases laborsupply. The
overaleffect of the income tax seems quite clearly (apart fromthe Nakamura
results) to decrease wives labor supply because of thesizeable uncompensated
wage elasticity which is typically found.
In Table 4.7wepresent results of }iausman (1981) for asample of wives by
quintiles. Mote that the effect of taxation is to increase laborsupply for the
lowest wage quintile but to decrease laborsupply for the other cuintile. The
overall effect compared to the no tax case is a reduction in
labor supply by 18%.
Hausman also found substantial deadweight loss to taxrevenues with the
TABLE4.7
The Effect of Taxes on Wives Labor Supply in theU.S.
Market Wage $2.11 $2.50 $3.03 $3.63 $5.79 Total
Change in +31.2% —14.2% 20.3% —23.8% -22.9% —18.2% LaborSupply
DWL/Tax Revenue 4.6% 15.3% 15.9% 16.5% 35.7% 18.4%
ratio about 18%. Given the magnitude of the estimatedelasticities the
deadweight loss estimate might seem small. However, when the factthat
nonparticipants in the absence of taxation will generally remain
nonparticipants
when taxes are levied and remain at the saneutility level is taken into account,
the finding is reasonable. The deadweight loss ratio wouldmore than double,56
i.e., exceed 40%, for labor force
participants. Hausrnan (1981b) considers a 10%
tax cut and estimates that wives labor
supply would increase by 4.1%. For a 30%
taxcut he estimates the increase in laborsupply to be 9.4%. Deadweight loss is
decreased significantly. Hausruans resultsdemonstrate an important influence of
taxes on wives labor force behaviortogether with a substantial economic cost of
the current tax system.
Feenberg-Rosen (1983) simulate the effects of numerousproposed changes in
the tax law on wives labor force behavior. Weconsider two cases: a tax credit
of 10% on the first $10,000 ofearnings and taxation of wives as single
individuals. For the tax credit case they findonly a very small effect on hours
of work. The impact of the lowermarginal tax rate on some individual is just
about cancelled by the income effect it hason other workers. However, the
effect of the tax change on currentnonparticipants is not treated altogether
correctly. Income splitting leads to predicted increase inlabor supply of about
5.5% for wives. Thus, the effect of lowermarginal tax rates leads to increased
labor supply although some of theprogressivity of the income tax is lost when it
is judged at the family level.
The results for wives demonstrate that incometaxation has an important
effect on wives labor supply decisions. Theeconomic cost of the tax system is
also substantial. Because of the joint treatment olfamily income, wives
typically face substantial marginal tax rates on theirearnings. No consensus
has bewen reached on theproper tax treatment of the fanily in the presence of
progressive taxation. Further econometric work will focuson more of a joint
decision framework for husband and wives,yet it is unlikely that the major
findings of an important effect of taxes will changedrastically. Various tax57
reform proposals such as tax credits reduce the effect of progressivity on wives.
However, important issues will remain unless a tax system rate with constant
marginal tax rates is adopted.58
NOT
Hausman (1983) investigates this issue.
2 Hausman (1981) doesaccount for zero hours considerations. Ham (1981)
considers constraints on further work at the givenwage.
Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) consider this problem for aspecial sample
of individuals for which data are available.
Ashworth and Ulph (1981) estimate household models of laborsupply. See
also Hausman and I?uud (1983).
This variation is calculated after the self—employed and farmers have
been eliminated from the sample.
6We do not use the earlier result of Hall (1973) and Wales (1973) and
Brown—Levin—Ulph (1976) because of difficulties of interpretation and
econometric technique.
Some models find a backward banding curve only for medium andhigh wage males.
8
Note that a distribution ordered by wages is probably better, since labor
supply choice enters the income measure.
Auerbach (this volume) contains a more detailed discussion ofdeadweight loss.
10 Thesemeasures correspond to the area under the ccmpensated demand curve
which is determined by the substitution effect in the Slutskyequation. For
further discussion see Hausman (1981c) or Diewert (1982).
For a more formal treatment see Varian (1978) or Diewert (1982).
12 The alternativemeasure of the equivalent variatrion uses post-tax
utility U' as the basis for measuring welfare loss. For labor supply in the two
goodset—up the equivalent variation typically gives a higher measure of welfare loss than does the compensating variation.
13
Here we follow Diamond and McFadden (1974) and use taxes raised at the
compensated point. Kay (1980) has recently argued in favor of using the
uncompensated point. As with C.V. and E.V. measures the problem is essentially
one of which is the better index number basis.
As a historical note it is interesting to point out that Harberger's
(1964) seminal calculation of the dead'eight loss from the income taxused an
income elasticity quite close to the estimate of Hausman (1981).However, he
took the uncompensated wage elasticity to be large and negative.Therefore, the
Slutsky equation ].ed to a near zero compensated wage elasticity so that
Harberger's estimate of the deadweight loss was very small. On thecontrary,
Hausman (1981) finds the uncompensated wage elasticity to benear zero.59
Of course problems still exist due to the necessity f interpersonal
comparisons, c.f. Atkinson—Stiglitz (1976) and Stiglits (1952). The optimal
income tax literature begins with Mirrlees (1971). For surveys of the literature
see Mirrlees (1932) and Atkinson—Stiglitz (1980).
16 The child care credit reducesthe tax rate but its effect on the
participation decision is decreased because of fixed costs. Also note that
beginning in 1983 the apprpriate marginal tax rate will decrease because of a
credit included in the 1981 tax reform legislation.
17 Given these facts it isa surprising that labor economists who work on
female labor supply have largely ignored taxes. The recent book editedby Smith
(1980) has only one mention of taxes in all of the papers. This omission iseven
more surprising in light of the substantial estimated labor supply elasticities.
18 The large negativeelasticity estimates are incompatible with economic
theory because they imply a downward sloping compensated labor supply curve.
19 These estimates take into account thelabor supply response of husbands
and their change in net, after tax, income.60
5.High Income Groups
Considerableinterest has arisen over potentially large workdisincentive
effects on two economic groups:very low income and very high income groups.
Both groups face high marginal tax rates on earnedincome; usually the marginal
rate is .5 or higher. Our knowledge of the effect of thehigh marginal tax rates
on low income groups has been increased considerably bygovernment—conruce
cross section data sets and most importantly by the fournegative income tax
experiments. The results of these NIT experiments will be consideredin the next
section. Yet very little reform of the tax system and itstreatment of low
income individuals has been accomplished. On the otherhand, our knowledge of
the effect of high marginal tax rates on high incomegroups has advanced little
in the past decade.1Yet significant changes in the tax systemsas they affect
earned income for high income groups has taken place. TheUnited States lowered
the maximum marginal tax rate on earned income from .7 to.5 in 1969, and the
Thatcher government in England has also significantly reducedthe highest
marginal rates in 1979. Furthermore, earnings at which the maximum taxlevel is
reached have increased dramatically in the U.S. under the taxreform legislation
of 1981. In 1983 the 50% rate will be reached at $109,000on a joint return; in
1984 the maximum rate will be reached at $162,000. 'Thechange in rates from
Table 2.2 is remarkable. While high incomegroups certainly complain loudly
abouttaxes, none of the surveys which we will sumnarize have founda significant
disincentive effect of the high tax rates. Thus wemight conclude that a
convincingefficiency argument does not exist for lowering the marginal rates of
high income groups, but vertical equity considerations haveprobably been
foremost in legislators' deliberations.2
Almost all of our empirical Imowledge of the effect oftaxation on the labor61
supply of high income groups arises from interview surveys. An important sample
selection problem exists which has remained almost unnoticed, Holland (1976).
Since we would expect on average high income groups work more, those individuals
who are led to work less by the disincentive effect of the tax systemare less
likely to be surveyed. Thus, a sample selection bias exists for the finding of a
small disincentive effect. And a small disincentive effect has been the
overwhelming finding of the interview surveys. Yet the empirical, results have
been so striking, that is probably safe to conclude that thesample bias is not
giving a spurious result. For instance, it does not appear that within the
surveys that the highest income groups are affected to a lesser extent than lower
income groups. Thus, the primary finding of the survey literature is that while
a disincentive does exist, its likely magnitude is not especially large.
The classic study in disincentive effects on high incomegroups is Break's
(1957) survey of lawyers and accountants in Great Britain. Break conducted 306
interviews on a group of individuals both familiar with and having theability to
react to the disincentive effect of the high marginal tax rates which existed in
Great Britain at that time. Break found that the majority of therespondents
were not significantly affected by the tax system on their work effort. Of the
49% who reported an effect, only 18% cited disincentive effects while 31% &ited
an incentive effect from the tax system. Thus, the overall incore effect
dominated the substitution effect for these individuals.3 Using a muchmore
stringent criterion where the interpretation of the sample responses was
clearest, Break concluded that 14% of the sample were significantly affected by
taxation. The tax incentive effect still predominated with 8% of the original
sample working harder because of the tax effect. Still, Break concluded that a62
a small net disincentive effect might exist because the 6% who reported a
significant disincentive effect had higher earnings than the s%whoreported an
incentive effect.
Break's original study has been repeated by Fields and Stanbury (1970,1971).
Fields and Stanbury find a significantly higher percentage of respondents report
a disincentive effect than did Break. They concluded that the disincentive
effects had become more important over time as individuals had adjusted their
labor supply slowly to the continued high marginal tax rates. But, on the other
hand, the 6% who showed significant disincentive effects in Break's survey had
fallen to only 2% which those individuals with significant incentive effects had
also declined markedly. Both studies do find that disinbentive effects increase
with income yet we might well conclude that this finding primarily arises from
an income effect, not a substitution effect. The tingle important quantitiative
finding in the Fields and Stanbury survey is that no significant difference
exists between average number of hours worked among groups of individuals who
reported disincentive effects, incentive effects, or no significant tax effects.
Thus, whatever net effect may exist its likely empirical magnitude is small.
Similar interview survey of American business executives have been conducted
by Sanders (1951) and by Holland (1969). From his interviews of 135 business
executives and 25 professional men, Sanders found the effects of taxation to be
quite small. Sanders concluded that important non-financial incentives more than
outweigh the change in financial incentives that taxation creates. Probably the
mostimportant effect of' taxation that Sanders found was the amount of time used
increating responses to taxation through investment and tax avoidance programs.
The economic cost of this type of response is probably substantial and has63
undoubtedly increased in magnitude since Sanders' survey.4
Holland (1969) conducted interviews of 125 business executives in which he
attempted to isolate the substitution effect by considering a hypothetical tax on
potential income. The amount of the tax would be about the same as the tax paid
currently. However, it appears to me that the effort is not totally successful
because of the nonlinearity of the budget set discussed in Section 1. There we
pointed out that the Slutsky equation does not adequately describe the tax
response because of the presence of virtual incomes different from nonlabor
income. Thus, Holland's technique would seem to be exactly correctonly in the
case of a proportional tax system.5 Bollandts findings are much in line with
previous results. The hypothetidal change in the tax system would have no effect
on 80% of the sample. Fifteen percent of the sample indicated they would work
harder while one individual claimed he would work less hard. Holland seems to
conclude that on average a tax incentive effect exists, at least in the
substitution effect. But he concludes also that the magnitude is likely to be
small. Thus, his results accord well with the Break results and Sanders results.
The last sample interview we consider is Barlow, Brazer, andMorgan(1966).
They conducted 957 interviews with individuals who had income exceeding $10,000
in 1961. They also attempted to include a disproportionately large number of
very high income people in the sample. Their results are again very similar to
previous findings. Approximately 88% of the sample individuals responded that
the income tax did not effect their work effort. Among the 1/8 of the sample
which reported disincentive effects. Barlow, et al. concluded that the actual
magnitude of the disincentive isd likely to be very small. In fact, they
estimated the total effect on the economy to be of the order of .3% in 1963.64
Given the rather different samplecoverage the Barlow results seem quite similar
to the results found in the other studies.
From these results we should not reach the too sanguineconclusion that high
marginal tax rates may not have a significant economic cost. We havealready
mentioned the large amount of effort thatgoes into shifting ordinary income into
capital gains which are taxed at a much lower rate. Evidence ofconsiderable
economic waste appears periodically from these schemes.But, the important point
to note here is that these machinations seem to havevery little effect on work
effort. Presumably, for most people it isvery difficult if not impossible to
shift compensation from working directly into capital gains.Furthermore, the
sensitivity of their work response is low to a given marginal tax rate.Perhaps
these results are not too surprising. For non—high incomeindividuals, the
(uncompensated) work disincentive effects is found to be smallin econometric
studies. Previous findings that, if anything, the incomeeffect predominates is
in accordance with Break's findings. Recent econometricstudies have found the
income effect to be the most important determinant in behaviortoward taxation.
Thus, in terms of work response it does not appear that the richare different
thai the rest of us. But, they do have moremoney.65
NOTES
1
The last significant survey is Holland (1969). Also, the most recent
extensive survey of the literature is Holland (1976).
2 Certainly large amounts ofeconomic resources are used to lessen the
burden of taxation by using the capital gains provisions and other taxpreference
provisions of the tax laws. But this observation has little bearing on the work
effort of the high income groups themselves.
From a social welfare analysis point of view, little comfort arises from
these findings. It is important to remember that only the substitution effect
creates deadireight loss. Thus, even if the income effect is largeenough to
outweigh the substitution effect, considerable deadweight loss may still exist.
1Executivecompensation through stock options and other non—wage
compensation become an effective and important method to partly avoiding the high
marginal rates. But the combined effect of the .5 tax limit on earned income in
the 1969 Tax Reform Act and the 1976 Tax Reform Act provision for stockoption
plansdecrease the importance of non—wage compensation. The ta-x legislation of
1951 increased the attractiveness of stock options to their pre-1976 status.
Itis the case that Holland will find the sign of the substitution
effect. However, his work cannot be used to estimate empirical magnitudes.66
6.Evidence from NIT's and Social Security Effects
Four negative income tax (NIT) experiments have beenconducted by the
government to produce information about the likely effects on laborsupply of
replacingthe current welfare system by an NIT. Three urbanexperiments took
place in New Jersey, Gary, Indiana, and Seattle—Denver. A ruralexperiment also
tookplace in Iowa and North Carolina. We review only the urbanexperiments
since we have excluded farmers from our previous analysis.1In principle, the
NIT experiments might seem to be an ideal laboratory in which todetermine the
effect of taxes on the labor supplyresponse of low inceme workers.2
Observations were recorded on individuals before theexperiment began, and during
the three year period of the experiments twogroups were observed. The
experimental group was subject to an NIT plan while a controlgroup received
nominal payments to participate in the experiments. Yet theinitial results were
not clear cut. Analysts found the results disappointing. A.Rees, in his
summary of the New Jersey results, concluded that 'the differences in work
behavior between experimentals and controls for male heads ere, as we
expected, very small. Contrary to our expectations, all do not showa clear and
significant pattern; indeed they show a discernable patternonly after a great
deal of refined analysis."3 Unforeseen problems did arisewhich, in retrospect,
is not surprising since the New Jersey NIT experimentwas the first social
experiment ever conducted. Statistical problems which arise inconducting
experiments with human subjects over time had not been accounted for.1' For
instance, the attrition problem in the New Jersey experiment almostcertainly
accountsfor the anomalous results found for black and hispanic males.67
Subsequent analysis of the New
Jersey and other two urban NIT experiments has led to more definite conclusions
about the labor supply response. We will give a brief review of the evidence.
We first consider the evidence for male heads of households. Twoimportant
differences from the non—NIT framework arise for the analysis. Contrary to the
usual case of analyzing the effect of taxes on labor supply where the
substitution effect is considered to be much more important than the income
effect, both the income and substitution effect are important for an NIT. The
expected additional cost of an NIT program over the existing welfare program is a
crucial consideration. Thus, we are very interested in the overall laborsupply
response rather than just the diâtortion created by taxation. The second
difference is that for males both the income and substitution effect work to






Non—labor income y is replaced by the NITguarantee G which will havew the effect
of reducing labor supply for an individual whowas initially on the first budget
segment so long as leisure is a normal good. At thesane time the net wage
which was subject only to PICA contributionsnow is lowered to 'whichis subject
to approximately a .5 tax rate. Thus, laborsupply will be reduced since the NIT
budget segment lies uniformly above the first non—NITbudget segment.5 For
individuals initially on the second segment but belowbreakeven ii the same
reasoning holds. Non—labor income has risen fromy2 to 0 and Risless than
w2.
Lastly, many individuals above breakeven hours 11 will notchange their labor
supply at all, but others will shift down below H because of theincome effeot of
the guarantee.
In fact, the findings agree with this economictheory. The labor supply
reduction in hours worked forwhitemales in New Jersey was about 4 uncorrected
for attrition. In Gary for black males itwas about 6% uncorrected for attrition
and10%when corrected for attrition, and in Seattle-Denverthe response was 5%
uncorrectedfor attrition. While these overall resultsare of interest, they are
not sufficient for policypurposes. They are an average response over the many
NIP plans used in each experiment.6To obtain reliable cost estimates, itis
necessary to construct a model which permits determination of income and
substitution effects. Then the cost of differentplans can be forecast from the
estimated parameters.7
Hausman—Wise (1976) was the firstpaper which took explicit account of the
form of the NIT budget set in constructingan empirical model. They used an
instrumental variable procedure to predict the netwage and virtual income along69
witha budget segment andestimateda log linear labor supply specification for
white males in the New Jersey experiment.They found an uncoctpensated wage
elasticity of .14 and an income elasticity of —.023.Thus both effects in
Figure6.1 have significant effects in reducing laborsupply. The poverty level
for afour person in New Jersey was$3,300. Thus for an individual who received
thepoverty limit as the guarantee and faced a 5 marginaltax rate the
uncompensatedwage effect would lead to an expected labor supply reduction of
about 8% while the income response would lead toan expected reduction of between
10—16% if the person had initially been on the firstbudget segment. Taking
midpoints we would have an overall expectedresponse of 21% in labcr supply. For
an individual initially on the second segment hemight have no response to an NIT
at all. For those initially below breakeven hours1 on the second segment the
wage effect is 6% with the income effect leads to a reduction of 1%so that the
overall response is about 7%. Taking weightedaverages of the two responses
leads to an expected labor supply reduction for thoseindividuals below breakeven
hours of 16.5%. It is very important to note thatthe model predicts only 17.6%
of the population will fall below breakevenso that the overall population
response is about 4%.8 Some confusion has arisen over theresponse condItioned
on being below breakeven hours and the overall populationresponse. The latter
response is appropriate for cost estimates of an NIT.
Burtless—}jausman (1978) analyze the labor supplyresponse among black males
in the Gary NIT experiment. They use a procedure totreat taxes very similar to
the technique used in Section 4 except for the choiceof a log linear labor
supply surve. In particular,they treat the budget set as exogenous rather than
using an ad hocinstrumental variable procedure and they also allow fora70
distribution of tastes in the population. Here in Table 6.1we present their
results for both control individual3 and forexperimental individuals on a weekly
basis for the mean individual in thesample. We first note that breakeven hours
are quite high for some of the plans so that the individual willalmost certainly
be below breakeven. Also note that a significantdispersion exists in the
expected response —itis about 13% for low wage groups. Perhapseven more
importantly the distribution of tastes parameter indicated that most ofthe
response takes place via the income effect for a small number of individuals.
The great majority of individuals do notsignificantly alter their work response
so that the effect of the NIT leads to a very skewedresponse in the population.
On the other hand, the uncompensatedwage change has very little effect. We can
see the income and substitution effect by comparing the rows whichcorrespond to
a $2.25 wage since the individuals will always be on the firstbudget. No
difference in responsde at all is found for the .4 or .6 tax ratewhile the high
guarantee leads to a 9% greater response than does the lowguarantee. At higher
wage rates the amount of the tax does play a role, but only because it changes
the amount of breakeven hours and thus theprobability of being above breakeven.
The find that the income effect is the major determinant oflabor supply
reduction among males was also found by Moffitt (1978) who useda quite different
different probit type of model. The results differmarkedly from the Hausman-
Wise findings for New jersey where the income effectexplained about 68% of the
change in hours. It would be interesting to determine if this resultoccurs
because of different model specification or because ofa fundamentally different
response pattern aoong the two populations.9










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Keeley, et al. (1978) for the Seattle-Denver experiment. While theSeattle-
Denver experiment is superior in certain respects from theother urban
experiments, the ad hoc method used by the authors to treat thebudget set is not
entirely satisfactory. They use a first difference specificationwhere the
change in income is done at pre—experimental hours of work for theindividual as
is the change in the net wage rate. Since pre-exterimental hoursare an
endogenous variable, an important simultaneous equation biasmay be introducedj°
However, the magnitude of the bias is difficult to estimate. At themean of the
sample Keeley et al. found the income effect to explain 46% of the reductionin
hours while the change in the wage explained the other 54%. Theseresults differ
maikedly from the results in the New Jersey and Garysample where the change in
non—labor income is the more determinant of the reduction In laborsupply.
Again, it would be interesting to ascertain whether the different resultsarise
because of the model used.
The other group whose labor supply might be markedly affectedby
introduction of a NIT is working wives. Neither the NewJersey nor the Gary
experiments had sufficient number of working wives to allow model estimation.
Keeley, et al. find an average response elasticity about four timesas large for
wives as for husbands. The mean labor force reduction is 22%. Merethe change
in income accounted for 75% of the total effect. Since most of thesewomen
presumably had working husbands, such a large scale withdrawal from the labor
force could be an important effect of an NIT.
The last group to be considered is female headed households. Most of the
affected population qualifies for AFDC so that introduction ofan NIT leads to a
substantially higher guarantee and somewhat lower tax rate under most NIT plans.73
Keeley,et al. found the female heads response to be about twiceas large as the
male response. The mean labor force reduction is 11%. Herethey found the
income effect to explain about 66% of the totalresponse. Hausan (1980) in a
study of labor force participation among black females who headed householdsin
Gary again found the level of the guarantee to be much more importantthan the
NIT tar rate. For instance he finds that the change froma .4 to .6 NIT tat rate
reduces the probability of participation by about 2.5% whilea change in the NIT
guarantee from .75 of the poverty limit to the poverty limit reduces the
probability of participation 6.5%.In terms of comparing the expected effort to
that of AFDC it seems likely that a reduction in labor.supplywould result. Even
if the marginal tar rate fell from the AFDC level of .67toan NIT level of .4
the accompanying higher benefits would create a net disincentiveeffect. The net
result would be a significant increase in the cost of familysupport for female
headed households. At the same time the extra income which wouldgo to the
lowest income group in the economy might well lead to a netgain in social
welfare.
-
Theother literature which we review is the effect of the socialsecurity
earnings test on retirement behavior and labor supply. We discussed the social
security beneficiary budget set in Section 3 where we emphasized the
intertemporal aspects of the model. An important empirical fact doesappear with
respect to social security. Labor force participation has decreasedamong the
elderly over the postwar period in the United States. From74
1960to 1975 labor force participation for males. over 65 fell from 33%to 22%.
Over the same period for men aged 62—64 it fell from 81% to 60%. 1961is the
year in which Social Security eligibility for men 62—64 was introduced. An
important policy question is whether the decline in male labor force
participation is almost wholly a result of the early retirement provision of
Social Security and the rising real benefit level. Rising real incomefor
potential retirees during the period offers an alternative explanation forpart
ofthe observed behavior. Given recent policy proposals to extend theage of
early retirement from 62 to 65 yearsof age, the causes of early retirement
assume an important role in financial projections for the Social Securitysystem.
Three recent papers consider the causes of retirement over the 1965—1975period.
Baskin—Hurd (1982) ascribe almost all the decrease in labor forceparticipation
to Social Security. Diamond—Hausman (l982a,1982h) find that SocialSecurity is
the most important factor, yet if early retirement betweenages 62—65 were
stopped, the retirement probability would decrease by about 1/2 so thata
significant number of men would still retire during thatage period.11 Further
research is required here because of the complex interaction ofnon—retirement
labor supply and its effect on future socialsecurity benefits, c.f. Blinder et
al. (1980).
The other dimension of the effect of Social Security is theearnings test
for Social Security recipients. In 1982earnings beyond $6,000 are subject to a
50% tax rate until all Social Security benefitsare recovered, i.e., the
breakeven point H is reached in Figure 6.2. Burtless and Moffitt(1982) in a
recent study find that the earnings test has a major effecton retired males
labor supply decisions.12 Among retiredmen who are working the frequency75
distribution of hours worked has a pronounced spike at the kink pointH1 in
Figure 6.2 which provides strong evidence of the incentive effect of the earnings
test. This effect is to be expected given the pronounced kink atH1 hours where
the net wage is reduced for w to .5w. About 50% of working males were located at
the kink point and 90% worked hours either at or below the kink point
H1.
However, to analyze the overall effect of the earnings test non—participation
Figure 6.2
must be accounted for since upwards of 80% of the men in the Burtless—Moffitt
sample worked zero hours. Thus, overall the earnings test leads to a reduction
in expected hours of about 50 hours per year. However, for those men who are
'V
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working the removal of the earnings test would increase expected labor supply by
about 400 hours per year. Thus, the situation is very similar to the case of
wives discussed in Section 4 where tax changes have only a small expected effect
on non labor force participants. But considering the problem in this context,
Burtless—Moffitt mayhaveoverestimated the wage elasticity by their neglect of
fixed costs to working)-3 Still, they have provided strong evidence of the
effect of the earnings test on the labor supply behavior of Social Security
recipients.
-
Inthis section we have considered the empirical evidence from the NIT
experiments. Although numerous statistical and econometric problems arise, I
feel we have learned much about labor supply behavior of low incoce workers. We
now return to our question of the last section. There, we decided that labor
supply behavior of high income persons was not too different than middle income
individuals. What about low income people? From the experimental results, I
-conclude that the income effect is probably larger than we previously had
thought.Especially for male heads of households I feel that introduction of an
NITwouldhave a significant impact on labor force supply reduction by a small
proportionofthe population. I doubt that the NIT tax rate is nearly as
important as the level of the NIT guarantee. Thus, low income males do have low
wage elasticities as does the rest of the population; but their income
elasticities may have an important effect on labor supply behavior given the size
of the NIT guarantee. Similar results were found for female headed households
although they presently have AFDC so that the change might not be as large.
Lastly, the NIT results for wives seem quite different than the usual -results.
Their wages elasticities are much lower and income elasticitiesare much higher77
than had been found for middle income wives. But, the evidenceon wives is based
on only one sample and one estimation technique. More research needsto be done
on wives behavior under an NIT before we can be confident about the results.
Research of the effects of Social Security is still in anearly stage of
development. Little doubt would seem to exist that Social Security benefitsare
an important determinant of retirement decisions. Furthermore, theearnings test
does have an important effect on labor supply behavior of retirees. Further
research that accounts for the intertemporal aspects of the problem and theform
of the lifetime budget set is still needed.78
NOTES
A further problem exists since the results from the rural experiment seem
extremely difficult to interpret.
2All the experiments were designed basically to measure labor supply
elasticities. However, other interesting areas of research such as family
consumption patterns and family stability have been studied.
For a series of papers on the New Jersey experiment see the Spring 1974
volume of The Journal of Human Resources.
These problems are discussed in Rausman (1982b).
So long as the NIT segment lies uniformly above the previous budget
segment the net change in income must be positive. Thus, the income effect will
reinforce the substitution effect and cause a reduction in labor supply. Thus,
the level of the guarantee removes the usual interdeterminancy of the effect of a
change in the net wage.
6 Unfortunately, insufficientsubjects were included in each cell of the
experiment ot use classical ANOVA techniques to compute an accurate estimate of
the response to each NIT plan. Statistical problems which arose during the
design and duration of the experiment may preclude use of these techniques
anyway. See Hausman—Wise (1977,l979a,l979b).
Two potential problems arise in using the experimental results to produce
cost estimates. First, the demand side of the market could change significantly
for a nationwide NIT. In particular, individuals could choose workpatterns to
convexify their budget sets by working and not working in alternative accounting
periods.Also, the limited duration of the experiment may miss important long
range effects on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market.
8 The lowproportion below breakeven is due to the study of white males who
were relatively well off in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
The finding that it is the income effect which creates almost the entire
labor supply response is corroborated further by the tesults of Hausman—Wise
(1979a) who consider a model which corrects for attrition.
A further problem exists since people initially above breakeven hours
will not have their net wage or income affected by the experiment. The authors
attempt to treat this problem by including a dummy variable which again would
create simultaneous equation bias.
These studies are in stark contrast to Gordon and Blinder (1980) who in
their study of retirement descisions" assume(s) that social security is
irrelevant to retirement decisions." (p.279). No empirical study, to the best
of my knowledge, has come close to verifying this assumption.79
12 Burtless and ?loffittgo along way towards a complete model of the
lifetime budget set. However, Since their model isbasically cross sectional,
they do not account for increases in future social security benefitsfrom extra
years of work in an entirely satisfactory manner.
13 Rausnian(198la) found a lower wage elasticity for wivas whenfixed costs
to working here accounted for. Cogan (1981) madea similar finding in a model
without taxes.80
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